In the late fourth century the Cappadocian bishops Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa introduced into the theological discourse the distinction between substance and hypostasis. They declared that Father, Son and Spirit were one God because they shared the same account of being but that they were at the same time distinguished from each other through their characteristic properties ingeneracy, generacy and procession. Since the account of being, which constituted the divinity, was immanent in Father, Son and Spirit, each of the hypostases could be said to be comprised of two elements, the particular property and the common substance. In the fifth century this conceptual framework was accepted by all theologians, regardless of their understanding of the incarnation. In this passage John offers an interpretation of Cyril's formula "one nature of the Word incarnate" that brings it in line with Chalcedonian Christology. He makes a distinction between the noun "nature" and the attribute "of the Word", claiming that the former denotes the common divine nature whereas the latter denotes the hypostasis in which this nature is seen. In a second step he then claims that the "flesh endowed with soul and mind" is the common human nature, which is found in any human being. In this case he specifies that the flesh is not a separate hypostasis as this would endanger the unity of Christ. This point is discussed at greater length elsewhere in the text. There John denies the flesh all characteristic idioms because according to Cappadocian teaching a nature endowed with such idioms automatically becomes a hypostasis. 5 Here he is primarily interested in the natures themselves, which he prefers to call substances, because the latter term permits him to create a more forceful argument. It was universally agreed that the incarnated Word was consubstantial both with the other divine persons and with all human beings.
Moreover, the Cappadocians whose orthodoxy was beyond doubt had taught that the hypostases are consubstantial because they have a common substance. Thus John can claim that the twofold consubstantiality presupposes the existence of two substances in the incarnated Word. Moreover, again following the Cappadocians, he defines "substance" as the "account of being", that is, the set of properties that are found in all members of a species. The anti-Chalcedonians could not deny that the incarnated Word contained both sets of properties. Indeed, they made the same point when they spoke of a "difference in natural property". 6 By employing the term "substance"
instead, John could insinuate that "natural property" was nothing but "nature", since his adversaries accepted that the Cappadocians had used the terms "nature" and "substance"
interchangeably. 7 Unsurprisingly Severus rejects John's interpretation.
The God-clothed teachers of the mysteries of the Church say that the union is a composition of the flesh, which is evidently endowed with a rational soul, with the Word, following the inspired words of the Gospel, which proclaims clearly: "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us" -which union they also call incarnation and inhumanation and composition, in order that the divine Word, one hypostasis, united itself hypostatically with one particular flesh endowed with a rational and intellectual soul from the God-bearer Mary. Here Severus reiterates the Monophysite position that the terms "nature" and "hypostasis" are synonymous and that the "one nature" refers to a concretely existing individual, the Word.
Moreover, he claims that the flesh, too, would have been a particular nature or hypostasis if it had not been assumed by the Word at the very moment of its coming-to-be. This clarification became necessary because Severus had to justify the Monophysite formula "from two natures". Since in both cases the term nature appeared, he had to treat Word and flesh exactly alike. 9 Having thus set out his own position he proceeds to refute John's argument:
If you say, my good man, that you consider the one Christ to be "two united and indivisible natures", that is, two substances according to the generic signification and, as you have said, according to that which commonly appears in every human being, … and you consider the whole divinity, which appears in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, to be one nature -for this is commonality -, and you finally consider the whole humanity when understood generically to be one nature, but the incarnation and composition is the union of inhumanation, how do you escape laughter and a godlessness that exceeds all sense, namely the conclusion that arises from these indecent words and thoughts, that the Holy Trinity has incarnated in the whole humanity? 10 Here Severus declares that the union of two substances, which was proposed by John, results in the absurd scenario that all divine persons become incarnate in all human beings. It is evident that this scenario is the exact counterpart of Severus' own position where one divine individual is united with one human individual. It is alleged that "substance" signifies the collective of all members of a species. The common account of being is not considered at all, despite the fact that Severus uses the phrases "appearing in all human beings" and "appearing in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit", which were traditionally used to describe the immanent universal.
Another passage, which has survived in the original Greek, shows how strong Severus' focus on concrete individuals is:
Ἡμεῖς ἐκ δύο φύσεων λέγοντες τὸν Ἐμμανουὴλ οὐκ οὐσίας νοοῦμεν τὰς φύσεις, τὰς τῆς κοινότητος δηλωτικὰς καὶ πολλῶν ὑποστάσεων περιεκτικάς, ἀλλὰ τὴν μίαν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Λόγου καὶ τὴν μίαν σάρκα τὴν ἐψυχωμένην νοερῶς ἐξ ὧν ἀτρέπτως συνενήνεκται εἰς ἓν καὶ συντέθειται.
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When we say that the Emmanuel is from two natures we do not mean by natures the substances that are indicative of the commonality and comprehensive of many hypostases, but the one hypostasis of the Word and the one flesh endowed with soul and mind from which he has been brought together and composed into one without suffering change.
Here, too, the commonality is not the common account of being but rather the collective of all members of a species. As such it is not juxtaposed with the bundle of accidents but with an individual member of the species. Against those who say: "If you say that Christ has two substances, then the holy Trinity is inevitably become incarnate in the whole humanity." These are the problems of the adversaries. For they think perhaps that the substance of the divinity can be broken up into parts, and that one part of it is seen in the Father, another in the Son and yet another in the Holy Spirit, so that each hypostasis is recognised partially but not in all idioms of the divinity. We, however, are not driven to such a degree of ungodliness that we consider a partition and division of the divine substance, but say that each characteristic hypostasis has the marks of the divinity without any of them lacking, namely goodness, creativity
and whatever exists about the uncreated nature. For thus we also say that the Trinity is consubstantial, since the same substance is recognised entirely in three persons.
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In this passage John engages with Severus' main argument against his interpretation of nature as substance, namely that the incarnation would then unite the whole Trinity with the entire human race. He insinuates that Severus can only come to this conclusion because he has a wrong understanding of substance. According to him Severus wishes to divide the account of being and distribute its constituent elements among the different members of a species. In the case of the human being this would mean a fragmentation of the definition "rational mortal animal receptive of thought and knowledge", with the result that the quality "rational" would be found in one human being and the quality "mortal" in another. This is a rather curious argument. One would have expected John to accuse Severus of dividing the common human substance into particular substances. The reason for this shift from the extensional to the intensional meaning of substance may well be that John himself had no clear idea of how a substance can appear in a multitude of beings and yet be undivided.
In his response Severus can rightly claim that he has never harboured such a notion. He insists that the Word had the complete account of divinity and the flesh had the complete account of humanity but that they were nevertheless particular natures. He must, however, have felt that it was not enough simply to state his position because he then proceeds to explain how it can be that each member of a species has the same account of being. Significantly, he does in this instance not fall back on his customary strategy to replace substance as the account of being with substance as the sum total of all individuals belonging to a species. Instead he attempts to accord the intensional meaning of the term a place in his conceptual framework. 13 For the Syriac text see Severus, Against the Impious Grammarian, II.17, ed. Lebon, 152, tr. Lebon, 119.
Peter participates in the commonality of humanity and substance, which is rationality, mortality, and receptiveness of thought and knowledge, and in similar fashion Paul and John who are distinct from one another and in no way confused with one another, are themselves, too, participating in the commonality of substance, that is, they are rational and mortal and receptive of thought and knowledge.
14 In this passage Severus declares that all members of a species participate in the same account of being and are in this sense one. In a second step he then tries to establish how this new understanding of substance relates to his customary one. He comes back to this problem several times, which shows clearly that he did not find it easy to formulate an answer.
In us humanity, the whole substance encompasses many hypostases, that is, those of Peter and of Paul and of John and of all the others, but Peter and Paul and John are hypostases, which participate in the same substance in equal fashion -for each one of them participates in humanity perfectly and without diminution and is a human being, and is distinguished through his own characteristic and is joined with the consubstantial hypostases through absolute similitude, without there being a diversity of genus and of what is common, but he himself is not the whole substance and humanity, which encompasses each one of the hypostases.
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Here Severus juxtaposes two different meanings of substance. He claims that Peter participates in the whole substance -insofar as he bears in himself all constituent elements of the account of being, just as all other human beings do -but that he is not the whole substance -insofar as he is not the sum total of all individuals that have the same account of being but only one of them.
This raises the question: how does Severus conceive of the relationship between hypostasis and substance as the common account of being? Since for him hypostases are concrete beings one might think that he considers them to be primary substances in the Aristotelian sense. 16 If that were the case he would recognise in the divinity one common substance and three particular substances. Such a position was indeed held by some Monophysites in the later sixth century.
They were called "tetradites" because they introduced a fourth element into the Trinity, a position that was manifestly heretical. 17 Yet analysis of three further arguments suggests that Severus is not a "tetradite" avant la lettre. The first of these arguments takes as its starting point Basil's statement in the Letter to Terentius that "each one of us participates in being through the common account of substance", ἕκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν καὶ τῷ κοινῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τοῦ εἶναι μετέχει.
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Severus offers the following interpretation.
Each of us participates in the common humanity and the one substance above all, and is one man and one hypostasis. But he will not be called, because he participates in the substance, a substance and not a hypostasis. For the latter is the participant whereas the former is the participated. did not clearly distinguish between the intensional and extensional meanings of "substance" could not draw such a conclusion because for him it would have meant that the entire Trinity became incarnate in the entire human race. Therefore, he had to locate substance as the common account of being outside the hypostasis, or rather "above" it. This was a momentous step since it amounted to a complete rejection of the Cappadocian immanent universal, which was now replaced by an ante rem universal. The obvious consequence of such a position is that the hypostasis qua hypostasis is nothing but the characteristic idioms that mark out the individual. That Severus is indeed inching towards such a solution can be seen from the following argument.
For if each of the hypostases be deemed to be the whole substance because it participates in the commonality of the substance, our reasoning about substance and hypostasis will be muddled and ruined and there will be nothing to mark the divergence between the two; the former will not be indicative of what which is common and the latter will not be indicative of what which is proper. Does it seem to you that he who says this cuts asunder the substance of the Father and the Son, or that he shows that every hypostasis is in the substance of the divinity, when it has its concrete property in itself, and that because it is in no way different from consubstantial hypostases, it is said to participate with them in one and the same substance, because it is one substance above all hypostases of the same genus? … And we must also recognise another thing: that fatherhood, i.e. ingeneracy, or generacy, or procession are not empty names and "relationships bereft of realities" (as Gregory the Theologian says somewhere) but the fatherhood which exists in the Godhead, so that God is Father, and the sonship or generacy which exists in the Godhead, so that God is Son or offspring and likewise the procession which exists in the Godhead, so that the Holy Ghost is God proceeding.
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Here we encounter all the usual elements of Severus' Trinitarian theology. The hypostases are consubstantial because they are 'in' the substance and participate in the substance, two statements that for Severus evidently have the same meaning. The participated substance is 'above' the hypostases and unifies them because it is one. Then, however, Severus adds a further statement about the properties of the three divine persons. He declares that fatherhood, sonship and procession are 'in' the divinity, which in his conceptual framework means that they participate in it. What constitutes God the Father is the participation of the property "fatherhood" in the common account of being, and the same applies to God the Son and God the Spirit. It is evident that such a model is only viable if the properties themselves are hypostases. Severus feels justified to draw this conclusion because Gregory of Nazianzus had insisted that the properties were not empty names but had a reality of their own. Letter. 24 Damian, too, identifies the hypostases with the hypostatic properties and claims that the hypostases only become substantial through participation in the common account of being. 25 In order to make his case he has collected a substantial number of proof texts from theological writings of the fourth and fifth centuries, in particular the orations of Gregory of Nazianzus, which seem to imply equation of hypostasis with property. 26 Yet there can be no doubt that Severus was his main source of inspiration because all passages that introduce the crucial concept of participation are taken from the treatise Against the Impious Grammarian. 27 Damian could with some justification say that he had merely pulled together the different elements of Severus' speculation and drawn out their implications.
This does not mean that Severus and Damian engaged in the same discourse. As we have seen Severus needed to get rid of the immanent universal because he thought that if he did not do so the entire Trinity would become incarnate in the entire human race. This led him to define the hypostases as properties because only they were entirely different from each other. Damian's theological initiative was directed against Tritheism, the belief that Father, Son and Spirit were not only three hypostases but also three particular substances and that the common substance was a concept that had no existence outside the human mind and thus did not introduce a fourth component into the Trinity. 28 Damian's predecessor as patriarch of Antioch, Theodosius, had written a treatise against the Tritheists in which he declared that one could call Father, Son and
Spirit each "a certain substance" because the Fathers, too, had used this term but that one must not speak of three substances because the substance of Father, Son and Spirit taken together was only one. 29 Such a solution, however, could not satisfy the Tritheists. As John Philoponus pointed out, beings cannot be both united and differentiated at the same ontological level. 30 Damian must have felt that a more radical solution was needed, which addressed these criticisms.
Thus, then, we should in patristic fashion profess each as God and we shall not be censured justly for Tritheism, because there is not division qua God but qua Father, Son and Holy Ghost. But those who enumerate qua God and call each of them "God himself", and do not recognise the person in its own concept as one thing and God as another, cannot escape the charge of being Tritheists. 31 This statement is an implicit correction of Theodosius' position. Damian claims that when one accepts that a hypostasis is at the same time a substance one has to speak of three different substances. In order to avoid this conclusion, he makes a clear distinction between the one substance and the person "in its own concept", that is, the property. This is a neat solution to the problem. 32 It has only one drawback: it cannot be reconciled with the mainstream view that the hypostasis had a substantial component. As a consequence, Peter of Callinicum, the patriarch of Antioch, declares Damian to be a heretic. 33 This does not, however, mean that Peter has found a better way to counter the assertions of the Tritheists. He merely piles up proof texts from the Fathers, which show that hypostasis cannot be reduced to property, without addressing the question whether the substances in the hypostases could be counted or not. 34 His engagement with Damian's conceptual framework is also quite unsatisfactory. He defines the common substance not as the account of being but as the sum total of all hypostases and can thus arrive at the absurd conclusion that each divine hypostasis would participate in the sum total of all hypostases. 35 While there can be no doubt that Damian took the concept of participation from Severus, he was much more aware of the problems inherent in such a model. This is evident from the following passage:
So when we join the common to the property and say "God the Father", we do not simply indicate only the hypostasis by the terms, but the substantial hypostasis: by saying "God"
we make plain the substance and the common; by the denomination "Father" we indicate the hypostasis and the properness of the person, so that the substance will never be nonhypostatic, nor will there be found an unsubstantial hypostasis, except when as an invention of our mind the enquiring reason asks what each of them is in its own concept as has often been proved.... So God the Father is both participant and participated, i.e. is a substantial hypostasis and not simply only an indication of a hypostasis. For this is the cause of our opponents' error, because they do not consent, or do not want, to separate hypostasis from substance but confuse their meanings and are thereby confused.
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Here Damian insists that although one can distinguish in thought between hypostasis and substance a hypostasis is in reality never without a substantial component. Thus he seeks to avoid the impression that the Trinity consists of two different elements.
Damian also knows quite well that the term participation can be misunderstood because traditionally human beings were said to participate in the divinity. In order to defend himself against the accusation that he regards the properties as creatures he emphasises that participation in the Trinity is categorically different from participation in the created order.
When we say that the hypostasis participates in the substance we do not understand this in the same sense (far from it!) as when it is said about us that we are "participating in"
the divine nature but according to the concept befitting a substantial hypostasis.
37
Yet it needs to be admitted that his argument is not entirely successful. In one passage he offers a Platonising description of the order of being.
Hence, then, if we proceed in an order from the "one" to those in it and thence descend to creatures, the more we descend the more manifold becomes the impress on our minds until, attaining to ultimate division, we halt at plurality; and if we thence ascend again, we find nothing unique, even though in the upward course plurality is contracted gradually until in our returning we again reach the truly "one" from whom all that are have their existence.
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This statement suggests that the triad of Father, Son and Spirit is of a lower ontological order than the one divine nature and takes its place halfway between God and creation. 
